

International Scientific Conference

**The Downfall of Communism  
in East-Central and Southern Europe:  
An Attempt of Comparative Perspective**

Program and Abstracts



**Conference Venue:**

DS Jowita, Zwirzywiecka Street 7, Hall A  
Monday, June 24, 2019, Poznań

### **Organizatorzy/Organizers**

Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division

Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

Poznań Philosophical Society, Poznań Division

### **Koordynatorzy konferencji/Conference Coordinators**

Prof. dr hab. Krzysztof Brzechczyn (Institute of National Remembrance,

Poznań Division/ Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)

Dr Przemysław Zwiernik (Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division)

**Program**  
**Monday, June 24, 2019**

9:00–9:20: Opening/Otwarcie

**Session I: Poland in Central European Context**

**Chair/Prowadzenie: Krzysztof Brzechczyn (The Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division / Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)**

9:20–9:40:

Piotr Krzyżański (Faculty of History, Adam Mickiewicz University), *The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces during the System Transformation of 1989*

9:40–10:00:

Piotr Syczak (Faculty of History, University of Gdańsk), *Afera alkoholowa (Sznep Gate) or How “New” Capitalism Was “Born” in Gdańsk Province in the light of Materials from NIK, o. Gdańsk (State Audit of Poland, Gdańsk Branch)*

10:00–10:20:

Soonim Shin (Psychological Counsellor in Vienna), *The Solidarność “Paradox” and the Roman Catholic Church*

10:20–10:50: Coffee break/Przerwa kawowa

10:50–11:20:

János Kávássy (Research Institute and Archive for the History of the Hungarian Regime Change), *“The Country Compared to That:” Unique Features of the Hungarian Regime Change*

11:20–11:40:

Tadeusz Czekalski (Faculty of History, Jagiellonian University), *The Dualism of Post-Communist Memory: Specific Conditions and Phenomena of Limited Albanian Transformation*

11:40–12:40: Discussion/dyskusja

**Session II: Soviet Union and Collapse of Communism**  
**Chair/Prowadzenie: Rafał Paweł Wierzchosławski (University of Social Sciences and Humanities SWSP in Poznań)**

14:40 –15:00:

Dmitry Shlapentokh (Indiana University, USA), *Gorbachev's Reforms, Ideological Interplay and Collapse of the USSR*

15:00 - 15:20:

Krzysztof Brzechczyn (Institute of National Remembrance/Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań), *Paths of Democratization of the Post-Soviet Republics: Attempt at Conceptualization*

15:20-15:40:

Oleksandr Grytsenko (Institute of Cultural Studies, National Academy of Arts, Kyiv), *Decommunization of Culture in Ukraine: a Long Revolution?*

15:40-16:00:

Nadiia Honcharenko (Institute of Cultural Studies, National Academy of Arts, Kyiv), *The Downfall of USSR and Post-Communist Transformation in Ukrainian History Textbooks*

16:00-16:40: Discussion/dyskusja

16:40–17:00: Coffee break/ Przerwa kawowa

**Session III: Aftermath of Downfall of Communism: Populism and Deficit of Democracy in East Central Europe. The Panel Discussion**  
**Chair/Prowadzenie: Konrad Bialecki (Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division / Institute of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)**

17:00 - 19:00: The panel discussion with participation of Krzysztof Brzechczyn (Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division / Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań), Ferenc Hörcher (Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Science), Marek Nowak (Institute of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University) and Rafał Paweł Wierzchosławski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poznań Campus).

**19:00-19:15 - Closing remarks/zamknięcie konferencji**

# Abstracts and Biograms

**Piotr Krzyżański**

Faculty of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

### **The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces during the System Transformation of 1989**

The System Transformation of 1989 had put the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces in extremely difficult position. On the one hand, the geopolitical situation of Poland had changed. Instead of three neighbour countries (formally allies within the Warsaw Pact), Poland soon became surrounded by seven countries coping with many internal issues. Furthermore, the eastward expansion of the NATO was still debated by leading politicians, which forces an introduction of the “Hedgehog doctrine”, assuming that the defence must be prepared on all directions. On the other hand, internal changes in Poland, especially in area of rising democratization and attempts of implementation of the free-market economy, undermined the potential of Polish Armed Forces in most important fields: decision-making process and availability of military equipment in superior numbers. In following paper, I will discuss above mentioned issues and try to present how officers of the General Staff respond to those fundamental changes. Especially in terms of political and economic uncertainties, that were distinctive traits of the System Transformation. To do so, I will analyse articles published in military press of this period, particularly in “Żołnierz Wolności” and “Polska Zbrojna” and compare their content to memoirs of political or military decision-makers of this period. This solution should allow to find most appealing aspects of transformation and certain patterns in coping with it by military staff.

**Piotr Krzyżański** – PhD Candidate at the Faculty of Historical Studies of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Author of numerous articles regarding military history, including: *Military doctrines. Origin, types and application* („Teka Historyka” 27/28) and *The First Fitting to the Options for Change in 1990* („Reality of Politics. Estimates - Comments – Forecasts,” 2010/1). His area of interests is focusing on military doctrines, economic background of military organization and cold/post-cold war era.

**Piotr Syczak**

Faculty of History in University of Gdańsk

**Afera alkoholowa (Sznaps Gate) or how “New” Capitalism was “Born” in Gdańsk Province in the light of Materials from NIK o. Gdańsk ( State Audit of Poland, Gdańsk Branch)**

“Year 1989” brought beginning of fall of communism in Poland and as a side effect: new opportunities and problems. From one side of coin there where for example: democratization, freedom of speech but from another side of coin there where such problems like: difficulties with economy, scandals (e.i: FOZ scandals, Sznaps gate). In this speech I am going to present how sznaps gate in Gdańsk province looks from perspective of source material left by NIK o. Gdańsk. In first part I will present: why and how this scandals existed and its aftermath (e.i: Dominik Jarzębowski and Jerzy Ćwiek were stripped of their passive suffrage rights for 5 years by State Tribunal). In second part of speech I will tell about Gdańsk province in late '80 and how NIK worked from 1989 to 1991. Then I am going to present case study: how sznaps gate looked in light of controls left by Gdańsk branch of NIK. What is important this materials presents mainly how “new” capitalism was born in Gdańsk province and tackles issue of relations between state and “private sector” (e.i: inadequate law), but surprisingly there is little information about selling illegal alcohol from export.

**Piotr Syczak** - first year PhD student in history at University of Gdańsk. He is preparing dissertation about state and social audit in Gdańsk province from 1980 to 1990. He is also interesting in: contemporary history (especially: process of transformation from communism in Poland), local history, history of transportation and history of sport

**Soonim Shin**

Psychological Counsellor in Vienna

### **The Solidarność “paradox” and the Roman Catholic Church**

Already in the 1970s Adam Michnik stated that in communist society the Roman Catholic Church has become the “promoter” of “democratic reforms.” Piecuch, however, describing the often tense relation between Church and democracy in Poland after 1989, quoted Böckenförde’s remark about the Church’s “deep-rooted suspicion against democracy.” So how could the Church promote “democratic reforms,” being at the same time deeply suspicious against democracy? Is it true that – as Michnik meant – the Church could be “progressive”, although only in “totalitarianism” – and if so, why? Krzeminski distinguished three periods: Before martial law was declared, the voice of the Church was “just one voice among others” in the societal debate, while after the introduction of martial law the Church became the “sole” voice. After the end of martial law the “virtually democratic relation” between Church and society changed as well as the relations within the Church itself; the latter adopted “a more hierarchic and a more authoritarian character”. In 1991 Nobel prize winner Milosz asked whether Poland is a “theocratic state”, answering that the clergy has such a program. And Tischner wrote that the church has “ambitions” towards a confessional state, although the Polish bishops denied such ambitions in September 1991. The question is whether the Church allied with Solidarnosc just to dominate the new state, without being interested in realizing the democratic and participatory aims of the movement. Brzechczyn called it a “paradox” that – although the Solidarnosc mass movement was “a decisive impulse behind the collapse of communism” – the “ideological legacy of Solidarność” affected the transformations “to a fairly limited extent.” A positive answer to my question could – at least partly – explain Brzechczyn’s paradox.

**Soonim Shin** – earned a B. A. in German Studies at Daegu University in her native country South Korea and became a certified social worker in Germany. After studies in pedagogy, philosophy and sociology she received the grade of Magistra Artium (M. A.) from Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz. Her master thesis was about “Moral education according to Emile Durkheim”. Shin has written articles on Austrian novelist Rudolf-Jeremias Kreutz (who headed the Austrian PEN protest in 1933 against the burning of books in Nazi-Germany) and on his friend Austrian poet Theodor Kramer (who fled Austria in 1939), published in “Zwischenwelt”, the magazine of Theodor Kramer Society in Vienna. She has given lectures on the Nazi-time Viennese deportation camps (“last locations”) at the Vienna Center of Polish Academy of Sciences and at Lodz University.



**János Kávássy**

Research Institute and Archive for the History of the Hungarian Regime Change

### **“The Country Compared to That:” Unique Features of the Hungarian Regime Change**

The series of events that led to the regional regime change of the Eastern bloc have been many times described as revolutionary and inevitable, yet in their actuality they were none of that. In the middle of 1989 not a regional but a local regime change in Poland and Hungary seemed to be the likeliest scenario, an all the more fragile option. It was only after *Die Mauer* came down in Berlin that profound change became a regionwide must. From this perspective the Hungarian and the Polish stories are the most important ones as they had an impact not only each other but on all other countries as well. In the Hungarian People's Republic the struggle for Kádár's legacy within the ranks of HSWP ran parallel with rise of *de facto* opposition parties and their claim for political power. Unlike in Poland Hungarian dissidents formed small, many times rivalling groups, which at the peak had their members and supporters in the 10.000s and not in the millions, and so top-bottom elitist democratization was very much present both in the Opposition Roundtable and later at the National Roundtable talks. In this study I try to identify specific key features that made Hungary's own road to freedom and democracy a unique one.

**János Kávássy**, a research fellow at the Research Institute and Archive for the History of the Hungarian Regime Change in Budapest. He has published four books (both in Hungarian and English), and wrote more than 30 studies in both languages. His major works include *Nyugati szélben* (Lakitelek: Antológia 2015) on the different aspects of the Hungarian regime change, *Mások szemével* (Lakitelek: Antológia 2017) is a piece on the Hungarian Democratic Forum in the Western media (1987-1990), while *Sodrásban* (Budapest: Cepoliti Kiadó 2019) deals with Hungarian-US relations from 1978 to 1990. His key focus and interest is in US-Hungarian bilateral relations, Hungarian opposition parties and the Hungarian regime change, the evolution of US global supremacy, the rise and fall of *Pax Americana*.

**Tadeusz Czekalski**  
Institute of History  
Jagiellonian University in Krakow

### **The Dualism of Post-Communist Memory: Specific Conditions and Phenomena of Limited Albanian Transformation**

In comparison with other European Communist countries, the Albanian case seems to be exceptional for many reasons. The political and systemic formula that survived in Albania until the early 1990s resembled the Stalinist model, which in most countries of the Eastern Bloc had ceased to exist forty years earlier. The process of political transformation, which took place intensively in 1992-1997, ended in a political, economic and social disaster. The trauma of the communist era was largely dominated by the events of 1997, at the same time making the polarisation of contemporary attitudes towards communism - from its partial rehabilitation to the marginalization in the historical memory of contemporary Albanians.

**Tadeusz Czekalski** – employed in the Institute of History of Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He is an author of eight books (in Polish and English) and numerous papers in Albanian, English, French, Polish and Serbian. He edited *The Shining Beacon of Socialism in Europe. The Albanian State and Society in the Period of Communist Dictatorship, 1944-1992* (Krakow: Jagiellonian University Press 2013). His field of interests are: social and religious history of Balkan countries in 20<sup>th</sup> century, social history of communism and cultural culinary history of modern Europe

**Dmitry Shlapentokh**  
Indiana University South Bend

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### **Gorbachev's Reforms, Ideological Interplay and Collapse of the USSR**

Most Western observers hold that the USSR had fallen because its artificiality and inability to embrace the Fukuyamian “end of history” – the democratic capitalism of the American type. After a generation, this assumption looks naïve, to put it mildly. Not only has totalitarian China increasingly towered over the USA, but the increasing spread of “populism,” with its distinct “national-socialist” and authoritarian tinge in Europe, and Trump’s election in the USA – all testify that the “end of history” could have been quite different from what was envisaged by Fukuyama in 1989. The collapse of the USSR could be attributed to a single cause – Gorbachev, who truly believed that the USSR would exist without the iron grip of the Kremlin. While slackening control of the state, Gorbachev released various ideological trends which existed in Soviet society, and many of them were related to the nature of the Soviet state. While some of them provided the spiritual glue for the existence of the state, the others worked toward its destruction.

Some Russian ideologists professed a peculiar “Eurasianism.” The teaching was born among Russian émigrés in the 1920, and was a peculiar modification of official Sovietism. According to Eurasianists, the USSR, or Russia of the tsars, was not a traditional empire but a quasi-nation based on harmonious “symbiosis” of most ethnicities of the state. Jews, rootless and alien to Eurasian soil, were the only exception. Russian imperialists were the other group. They also believed that the USSR would survive and saw it as an empire. Still, in their view, it was not a “Eurasian” empire, in which Russians and minorities worked together for the common good, but a Russian empire in which the Russians would play the dominant role as the benign “older brother.” While the two previous trends worked for the preservation of the state, there were others which worked toward its dissolution. The isolationist Russian nationalists regarded the USSR as the enemy of the true Russian state. In their view, it was the minorities who always took advantage of the empire. It was they – Jews here played an important role – who drove Russians to global conquest and constructed the messianic agenda for the country’s life. It was these imperial delusions which induced Russians to share their precious resources with their ungrateful “brothers,” both inside and outside the USSR. Consequently, Russia should shed its imperial heirlooms and be much smaller and ethnically homogenous. Finally, there were “regionalists.” They represented Russian provinces and believed that Moscow was an imperial parasite which exploited provincial resources. These provinces, e.g. Ural, Siberia and the Far East, would be much better off as independent. These isolationist, anti-imperial trends prevailed and led to the disintegration of the USSR. And the last one could well endanger the existence of the Russian Federation.

**Dmitry Shlapentokh** was educated both in the former USSR and the USA (Ph.D, University of Chicago). The focus of his research is Russian and European history in broad comparative context. He is the author of several books and many articles. He is now Associate Professor of History, Indiana University South Bend.

## **Krzysztof Brzechczyn**

The Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division  
Institute of Philosophy of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań

### **Paths of Democratization of the Post-Soviet Republics: Attempt at Conceptualization**

The paper conceptualizes five basic developmental paths the post-Soviet republics followed. The conceptual framework of this paper is expanded theory of real socialism in non-Marxian historical materialism, namely proposed the model of secession from socialist empire. The first developmental path was followed by societies in which an independent civil revolution took place. This path of development bifurcates into two further sub-variants. Namely civil revolutions in the Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) resulted in the independence and stable democracies. Civil revolution in Caucasus republics (Armenia, Georgia) were partially successful because civil movement in these societies were unable to build stable democracies. Countries such as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine followed next developmental path. Its characteristic feature is active participation of republican communist nomenclatures in seceding from the Soviet Union and gaining state independence. In this variant of development, democratization - characteristic for the first period of independence was counterbalanced by the growing autocratization of political system. This path of development was divided into two developmental variants: in one group of countries (Ukraine) the growth of autocratization caused civil resistance (Ukraine), in the rest societies of this group (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova) - not. Finally the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) followed the fifth developmental path. In these societies, independence permitted to preserve dictatorship of local communist nomenclatures.

**Krzysztof Brzechczyn** employed in the Institute of National Remembrance in Poznań and as a full professor in the Institute of Philosophy of Adam Mickiewicz University. He has authored four books (in Polish) and numerous papers in Chinese, English, German, Italian, Polish, and Romanian. He edited *Modeling in History* (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi 2009), *Thinking about Provincialism in Thinking* (with K. Paprzycka Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi 2012), *Idealization XIV: Models in Science* (with G. Borbone, Leiden-Boston: Brill 2016). *Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth's Vision of Historical Sciences* (Leiden-Boston: Brill 2018), *New Perspectives in Transnational History of Communism in East Central Europe* (Berlin-Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 2019). His fields of interests are: current history, intellectual history, philosophy of history, philosophy of social sciences, political and social philosophy, and theory of history.

**Oleksandr Grytsenko,**  
Institute of Cultural Studies,  
National Academy of Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine

### **Decommunization of Culture in Ukraine: a Long Revolution?**

It was argued (by Taras Kuzio) that, after the collapse of Soviet Union, Ukraine began a complicated '*quadruple transition*' (from totalitarianism to democracy, from being a part of USSR to national independence, from state economy to free market, from a set of ethnic groups to modern nation). This description of the process, however complex, still lacks a cultural dimension, and so did, at least until recently, the reality of post-communist transformation in Ukraine.

Soviet cultural heritage (in broader meaning) has been quite palpable in many spheres of life. Soviet historical narrative is still popular and, in some periods, it seemed to be dominant in memory policies of the state. Until 2016, the country's symbolic space was littered with monuments to Lenin and other Soviet leaders. Works of Ukrainian Soviet literature, at least those once regarded as 'classical', retained its place in school curricula until recently.

Why the collapse of the USSR was not enough for Ukrainian society to get rid of this part of its Soviet past, and it took another two revolutions to launch a 'cultural decommunization' in earnest? What solutions were proposed, what policies were designed and implemented, by whom and to what effect? These are the topics of my presentation.

**Oleksandr Grytsenko** is a senior research fellow at Institute of Cultural Studies in Kyiv, former director (2002-2013) of Center of Culture Studies of Ministry of Culture. He authored several books in cultural studies, cultural policy analysis, and culture of remembrance, i.a.: *Cultural Policy: Concepts and Experiences* (1994), *A Wisdom of Our Own: National mythologies and civil religion in contemporary Ukraine* (1998), *Heroes and Celebrities in Ukrainian Culture* (1999, editor and co-author), *Prophets, Pirates, Politicians and the Public: Cultural industries and public policy in Ukraine* (2003), *Memory As a Local Product: Transformation of symbolic space and memory culture in Ukraine's small towns* (2014), *The Presidents and Memory: Memory policies of the Presidents of Ukraine, 1994-2014: backgrounds, messages, implementation, results* (2017), all in Ukrainian, and many articles at home and abroad.

**Nadiia Honcharenko**  
Institute of Cultural Studies,  
National Academy of Arts, Kyiv, Ukraine

### **The Downfall of USSR and Post-Communist Transformation in Ukrainian History Textbooks**

Before 1989, there was no such teaching subject as ‘history of Ukraine’ in school curricula in USSR, and no textbooks, too. After regaining independence in 1991, the main task in history education was to create Ukrainian history as teaching discipline from scratch (as some say, to ‘nationalize the history’). Soviet period was also an object of ‘nationalization’, not of rejection. Ukrainian history textbooks of 1990s mirror this attitude. Unlike in Central Europe, Soviet Ukraine was regarded a legitimate predecessor of independent Ukraine, not a product of Soviet occupation. History textbooks told about crimes committed by Soviet regime, but not that the regime itself was criminal or alien. The collapse of the USSR was explained as the result of natural progress of nations towards independence and of the bankruptcy of state-run economy.

Many historians, intellectuals, politicians demanded that elements of Soviet historic mythology be removed from textbooks and replaced with balanced accounts. The emancipation from Soviet heritage was slow, though. It was the revolutionary events of 2004 and 2014 that made radical changes in history teaching possible. Here are key changes in today’s textbooks:

- they don’t mention “October revolution in Ukraine”; instead, there is Ukrainian national revolution of 1917-1920;
- the term “Great Patriotic war” isn’t used either, the story of WW2 in Ukraine now begins in September 1939;
- Soviet regime is defined as criminal in the de-communization laws of 2015, and so on.

**Nadiia Honcharenko** is a research fellow at Institute of Cultural Studies in Kyiv. She authored several articles on history education, culture of remembrance, i.a.: *Myths in contemporary Ukrainian history textbooks* (1998), *The School of Othering* (2001), *Cossack’s wars and rebellions in history textbooks: old and new interpretations* (2010), *School’s history teaching and formation of historical memory and identity* (2012), *History education and comprehension of totalitarianism: school textbooks on tragedies of Ukraine’s minorities in 20<sup>th</sup> century* (2015), all in Ukrainian. Also works as translator/editor (Edukacja historyczna a współczesność. ed. *Barbara Kubis*, 2003 – Ukrainian translation: *Istorychna osvita i suchasnist*. Kyiv, 2007; Jerzy Topolski. *Jak się pisze i rozumie historię*. Poznań, 2008 – Ukrainian translation: *Jak my pyshemo i rozumijemo istoriju. Tajemnyci istorychnoji naracji*. Kyiv, 2012).

**Aftermath of Downfall of Communism: Populism and Deficit of Democracy in East Central Europe. The Panel Discussion** with participation of Krzysztof Brzechczyn (Institute of National Remembrance, Poznań Division/ Institute of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań), Ferenc Hörcher (Institute of Philosophy, Hungarian Academy of Science), Marek Nowak (Institute of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University) and Rafał Paweł Wierzechosławski (SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Poznań Campus). Moderator: Konrad Białecki (Institute of National Remembrance/Faculty of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań)

**Krzysztof Brzechczyn** - see biogram at the page 12

**Ferenc Hörcher** (born 1964) is a political philosopher and philosopher of art. He studied in Budapest, Oxford and Brussels-Leuven. He is the director of the Research Institute of Politics and Government, József Eötvös Research Centre of the National University of Public Service, and senior research fellow of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Science. He researched in Göttingen, Wassenaar, Cambridge, Edinburgh and at Notre Dame University, USA. His research fields include: classical Hungarian political thought, contemporary conservatism and liberalism, the intellectual history of the city, early modern political thought and aesthetic thought, Homepage: <http://fi.btk.mta.hu/en/about-us/fellows-of-the-institute/85-munkatarsak/172-horcher-ferenc-ig-2>

**Marek Nowak**, researcher at the Institute of Sociology of Adam Mickiewicz University. He specializes in sociology of economy, sociology of social activism, sociology of public sphere and urban revitalization. Co-editor of collective works (in Polish), including: *Declining City. Developing City* (Poznań 2008); *On Revolution. Images of Radical Social Change* (Poznań 2008), *How to Investigate Civil Society* (Poznań 2009); *On the Urban Public Sphere. Civicism and Conflicts over Space* (Kraków 2011), co-author of the monograph: *Evaluating Revitalisation. Study of Changes of Śródka Distric* (Poznań 2011) and monograph (both in Polish): *Theory of Irrational Action: Sociological Study on Volunteering and Social Activism* (Poznań 2015). Member of the Board of the Poznań Branch of the Polish Sociological Association, the Association of Rights to the City, cooperates with the Association of the Revitalisation Forum and the Council of the Grunwald South Estate in Poznań. Co-coordinates neighbourhood research conducted by the Center for Social Research of the Adam Mickiewicz University Foundation and Amica S.A.

**Rafał Paweł Wierzechosławski**, graduated in philosophy from the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. He continued his studies in Bielefeld, Köln, Paris, Louvain-la-Neuve, Genève, and Neuchâtel. His main interests are philosophy of social sciences, modern social theories, social ontology (collective intentionalities), political philosophy (republicanism), SSS, and STS (experts studies). He has taught at the Faculty of Philosophy, Catholic University of Lublin (1990–2015), Department of History, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań (2005–2014), and University of Social Sciences and Humanities SWPS in Poznań (since 2014). He is a member of the European Network of Social Ontology, the International Social Theory Consortium, the European Network of the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and the International Social Ontology Society.



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